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A FAIT ACCOMPLI FOR THE PBGC AND US TAXPAYERS:
HOW THE LAST HOPE FOR REDEMPTION WAS MISSED
IN THE 2005 BANKRUPTCY CODE REVISIONS AND
SUBSEQUENT COURT DECISIONS
JOHN P. HENRY*
IF YOU HAVE BEEN living in a cave for the last five years, or
have otherwise managed to miss the news, the traditional
United States domestic airline industry has been decimated by
the perfect storm of a 9/11-driven decline in air travel, dramati-
cally rising fuel prices, and unrelenting competition from low-
cost, no-frills regional carriers. In a last-ditch effort to respond
to these changes and survive, albeit in a much altered form, the
traditional hub-and-spoke carriers, such as United, US Airways,
and Delta, slashed spending on in-flight amenities and negoti-
ated reduced compensation packages with employees. These
measures, however, were met with limited success. In the last
four reported quarters alone, Delta Airlines has announced
stunning losses of $2.2 billion, $1.1 billion, $382 million, and
$1.1 billion.' UAL, the parent of United Airlines, fared slightly
better, reporting losses for the same periods of $664 million,
$1.1 billion, $1.4 billion, and $93 million.2
* J.D., Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law, 2006.
Evan Perez & Melanie Trottman, Losses Pile Up at Delta, Continental, WAi-i ST.
J., Jan. 21, 2005, at A3; Press Release, Delta Airlines, Delta Airlines Reports Re-
sults for June 2005 Quarter (July 21, 2005) (on file with author), available at
http://www.delta.com/print-doc.cfm?article_id=9797; CNNMoney.com, Bank-
rupt Delta Loss Tops $1 Billion (Nov. 10, 2005), http://money.cnn.com/2005/11/
10/ news/update-bankrupt.dj.
2 Press Release, UAL Corp., UAL Corp. Reports Fourth-Quarter Results (Jan.
27, 2004) (on file with author), available at http://ir.united.com/phoenix.zhtml?
c=83680&p-irol-news&nyo=0; Press Release, UAL Corp., UAL Corp. Reports First-
Quarter 2005 Results (May 11, 2005) (on file with author), available at http://ir.
united.com/phoenix.zhtml?c= 8 3 6 &0&p=irol-news&nyo=0; Press Release, UAL
Corp., UAL Corp. Reports Second-Quarter 2005 Results (July 28, 2005) (on file
with author), available at http://ir.united.com/phoenix.zhtml?c= 8 3 680&p=irol-
news&nyo=0.
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Seeing that traditional cost-cutting measures and executive re-
shuffling would be unable to stem the tide of red ink, each of
the above stalwarts of the American corporate world took the
last, most desperate option available to them: Chapter 11 corpo-
rate reorganization. US Airways entered bankruptcy protection
on August 12, 2002, for the second time. UAL filed in Chicago
on December 9, 2002.' Finally, citing competitive pressures
caused by its rivals shedding liabilities in bankruptcy, an issue
this comment will discuss in detail, Delta Airlines filed for bank-
ruptcy on September 15, 2005. 5
While some would say that these bankruptcies are a sign of a
well-functioning capitalist society, where weak, unimaginative
companies are disassembled to provide capital for strong, inno-
vative firms that provide value, few would argue that the system
in place to protect the pension plans of these large companies is
functioning at all. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
("PBGC"), created as part of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act ("ERISA") in 1974, stands as the guarantor of many
of this country's pension plans.6 The federally funded agency,
however, is heavily insolvent, with the fund reporting a fiscal
2005 year end deficit of $22.8 billion.7
The woes of the PBGC are well-reported, and sound recom-
mendations to modify the system's operating parameters to
shore up the system have been made for quite some time. Some
argue for increased premiums for all plans and higher variable
rate premiums for the most risky plans.8 Others believe that giv-
ing the PBGC priority in bankruptcy above its current status as a
standard unsecured creditor would allow the agency to recover
3 Press Release, US Airways, US Airways to Complete Restructuring Plan in
Chapter 11 Reorganization (Aug. 11, 2005) (on file with author), available at
http://www.usairways.com.
4 Press Release, UAL Corp., UAL Corp. Files for Chapter 11 Reorganization
(Dec. 9, 2002) (on file with author), available at http://ir.united.com/phoenix.
zhtml?c=83680&p=irol-news&nyo=0.
5 Harry Weber, Delta, N'west in Bankruptcy, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 15, 2005, at
Al.
6 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., Who We Are, http://www.pbgc.gov/workers-
retirees/about-pbgc/content/pagel020.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2006).
7 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., Frequently Asked Questions, Understanding
the Financial Condition of the Pension Program, http://www.pbgc.gov/media/
key-resources-for-the-press/content/page15247.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2006)
[hereinafter PBGC FAQ].
8 Jonathon E. Collins, Comment, Airlines Jettison Their Pension Plans: Congress
Must Act to Save the PBGC and Protect Plan Beneficiaries, 70J. AIR L. & COM. 289, 306
(2005).
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more from the bankrupt former plan provider, thereby reduc-
ing its asset-liability gap.' Each of these suggestions might have
prevented the current crisis from occurring. However, given the
gravity of the problem and the inherent deficiencies in the prac-
tical administration of these recommended solutions, a more
honest, long-term approach is required. Indeed, the PBGC esti-
mates the country's total plan underfunding at a staggering
$450 billion, a sum which might lead to an economic disaster
capable of dwarfing the savings-and-loan crisis.' ° Such a large
deficit cannot be met with incremental changes but must be
dealt with through wholesale change or abandonment of the en-
tire system.
The purpose of this Comment is to discuss the current PBGC
underfunding problem as it relates to today's airline bankruptcy
mania, to describe two missed opportunities to partially avert
the coming economic crisis, and finally to suggest that the only
way to "repair" the agency is to terminate government involve-
ment in pension-plan regulation and supervision and to judi-
ciously allocate losses from the ill-devised plan among airline
shareholders, creditors, pension enrollees and, inevitably, the
taxpayers. The history of defined-benefit and defined-contribu-
tion retirement plans in general, and ERISA and the PBGC in
particular, should be well known to readers by this time. There-
fore, Part I will provide a summary of the three mechanisms by
which pension payments can become the obligation of the
PBGC and the financial ramifications of the PBGC's assumption
of a terminated plan. Part II will then describe how the recent
overhaul of the Bankruptcy Code, with the passage of the Bank-
ruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
and recent case law concerning the PBGC's power to barter with
bankrupt airlines might have been the last opportunities to
make meaningful incremental changes capable of correcting
the PBGC's funding troubles. Finally, Part III will examine pre-
vious suggestions for repairing the PBGC and ultimately explain
why the best option for dealing with the country's pension-fund-
ing issue is to address the problem head-on, distribute losses
among all parties involved, and force companies and employees
to use market-driven mechanisms for retirement-based income.
9 Amy Lassiter, Mayday, Mayday!: How the Current Bankruptcy Code Fails to Protect
the Pensions of Employees, 93 Ky. L.J. 939, 953 (2004).
10 PBGC FAQ supra note 7.
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I. HOW THE PBGC ACQUIRES A TERMINATED
PLAN, AND WHAT THAT MEANS
FOR ITS BOTTOM LINE
This section will describe the three methods by which the
PBGC acquires terminated pension plans: "standard" termina-
tion, distress termination, and involuntary termination. It will
then describe the effects that a typical plan from each acquisi-
tion type will have on the PBGC's balance sheet.
A. STANDARD TERMINATION
The easiest method for a corporation to end its pension-plan
obligations is through a voluntary termination of its pension
program in compliance with the statutory requirements of no-
tice and plan liquidity.1 Standard terminations would apply
where a corporation wishes to end its involvement with a fully
funded plan, either because it no longer wishes to offer retire-
ment plans or has chosen instead to offer more modern de-
fined-contribution plans. 12 Two important provisions of a
statutory standard termination make this option unattractive
(and probably impossible) for distressed airlines. First, any stan-
dard termination requires that the corporation not "violate the
terms and conditions of an existing collective bargaining agree-
ment."' 3 Each of the airlines, however, has been forced or has
chosen to engage in extensive negotiations with its pilots' union,
flight attendants' union, and mechanics' union in efforts to re-
duce operating costs. 4 These negotiations have invariably led
to detailed collective bargaining agreements, thereby preclud-
ing the airlines from eligibility for standard plan terminations. 15
Even if this was not the case, however, the severe underfunding
of the airline plans would also prevent standard termination.
Standard terminations may only be undertaken in circum-
stances in which, "when the final distribution of assets occurs,
the plan is sufficient for benefit liabilities."' 6 The PBGC will
" 29 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 2005).
12 For a general description of plan types, see http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/
retirement (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
13 29 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (a) (3).
14 See, e.g., Associated Press, Leaders of United's Pilots Union Recommends Tentative
Agreement, USA TODAY, Dec. 17, 2004, at D4; Associated Press, United Airlines Con-
tinues Labor Talks, May 31, 2005, http://www.wkyc.com/news/news-article.aspx?
storyid=35673.
'5 29 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (a) (3).
16 Id. § 1341 (b)(1)(D).
378
then undertake to distribute assets according to the plan's distri-
bution scheme.1
7
In general, standard terminations allow a corporation to end
its defined benefit pension plan without abandoning its obliga-
tions to its employees and without financially burdening the
PBGC and, through it, American taxpayers. As such, they have
little effect on the PBGC's balance sheet and are not prevalent
in standard airline terminations.
B. DIsTEss TERMINATION
Congress also provided a means for plan providers to termi-
nate their obligations when the burden of continuing the plan
threatens the continuing viability of the organization.'" Perhaps
fearful of giving the troubled corporation the power to declare
itself so burdened, Congress entrusted the authority to make
this decision to two different third parties: the PBGC and, if ap-
plicable, the bankruptcy judge presiding over the corporation's
bankruptcy proceeding. 19
In an ongoing liquidation, no further requirements for plan
termination are required.2" In an ongoing reorganization, the
bankruptcy court must decide "that, unless the plan is termi-
nated, such [corporation] will be unable to pay all its debts pur-
suant to a plan of reorganization and will be unable to continue
in business outside the chapter 11 reorganization process .... ,
The bankruptcy judge must also determine that termination of
the plan and the procedures used to affect the termination each
meet strict requirements as described in the Bankruptcy Code:
(1) the debtor or trustee must make a proposal to the em-
ployee representative based upon the most complete and reliable
information available;
(2) which provides for those necessary "modifications" to the
benefit plan necessary to allow the corporation to reorganize;
(3) that assures that all creditors, debtors, and other parties are
treated fairly and equitably;
(4) and confer with the employee representative after submit-
ting the proposal in a good faith attempt to negotiate an agree-
ment on modifications to the plan;
17 Id. § 1341 (b) (3) (A) (ii).
18 Id. § 1341(c).
,9 Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B).
211 Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(i).
21 Id. § 1341(c) (2) (B) (ii).
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(5) where the employee representative rejects the proposed
modifications without good cause;
(6) and where "the balance of the equities clearly favors rejec-
tion of such agreement. "22
Once these requirements are satisfied, the judge may termi-
nate the plan.23 Upon termination, employee pension expecta-
tions take a dramatic freefall in expected value. The PBGC
officially takes over the pension obligations, with the now-bank-
rupt corporation becoming a debtor to the PBGC. 24 A small
portion of the corporation's pension obligations may be given
somewhat elevated priority under the Bankruptcy Code system
of ranking creditors; however, this is limited to current workers
and to an insubstantial portion of the total plan funding.2 5 In
comparison, the remainder of the PBGC's unsecured claim is
lumped together with other general unsecured creditors with-
out being afforded any substantive protection.26 This gives the
bankrupt corporation's trustee or the debtor-in-possession, as
well as all other secured and unsecured creditors, perverse in-
centive to terminate pension plans and leave current and for-
mer employees to pay the costs. 2 7 Indeed, some academics have
calculated average pension plan member recoveries at approxi-
mately 8% of their face value.28
Alternatively, the PBGC itself can find that either "unless a
distress termination occurs, such [corporation] will be unable to
pay such [corporation's] debts when due and will be unable to
continue in business," or "the costs of providing pension cover-
age have become unreasonably burdensome to such [corpora-
tion], solely as a result of a decline of such [corporation's]
workforce covered as participants. ' 29 A distress termination pro-
ceeding in which the bankrupt or insolvent corporation seeks
PBGC approval for its plan termination should be distinguished
22 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(b)-(c) (West 2005).
23 Id.
24 29 U.S.C.A. § 1362(b) (West 2005).
25 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a) (4).
26 Daniel Keating, The Continuing Puzzle of Collective Bargaining Agreements in
Bankruptcy, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 503, 539 (1994) (current.employee pensions
have some very limited protection, but the remainder of current employee and
former employee pensions are given neither administrative claim priority nor ad-
vanced general standing).
27 Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991 Wis. L.
Ri~v. 65, 66-67 (1991) [hereinafter Keating, Pension Insurance].
28 Id.
29 29 U.S.C.A. § 1341(c) (2) (B) (iii) (I)-(II).
380
from an involuntary plan termination, which will be discussed in
Part I-C. It should be noted, however, that even though a pre-
siding bankruptcy judge or the PBGC could utilize its powers to
allow a distress termination under section 1341, the provisions
of section 1341 (a) (3) still prohibit the violation of a collective
bargaining agreement for purposes of section 1341 voluntary
corporate reorganization.3 0 As explained in Association of Flight
Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO v. PBGC, "[t]his 'contract bar' provi-
sion was added in 1986 as part of a Congressional effort to ad-
dress the preexisting 'termination insurance system [which] in
some instances encourages employers to terminate pension
plans, evade their obligations to pay benefits, and shift un-
funded pension liabilities onto the termination insurance sys-
tem and the other premium-payers."' 31 In doing so, however,
Congress had to walk a fine line between allowing troubled cor-
porations too much latitude in deciding whether to keep their
end of a pension system bargain and pushing them so hard that
they would abandon defined benefit plans altogether.3 2 As the
Sixth Circuit aptly summarized,
Though Congress was concerned chiefly with protecting the em-
ployees' expectations of pension benefits, it also realized that em-
ployers would not create, maintain, or expand pension plans if
ERISA imposed too much cost. Consequently, the entire statute
is a finely tuned balance between protecting pension benefits for
employees while limiting the cost to employers.
Part II discusses the issues of whether this "finely tuned balance"
has been effective and whether the roles played by the courts
and the PBGC are what were expected by Congress.
These three provisions allow the corporation, with approval,
to terminate a plan even though the accrued obligations exceed
the existing assets and to convey the underfunded burden onto
the PBGC. The efforts of the airlines to take advantage of this
provision are discussed in Part I-D.
30 Id. § 1341 (a) (3).
31 Ass'n of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO v. PBGC, 372 F. Supp. 2d 91, 96
(D.D.C. 2005) (quoting In re Chateaugay Corp., 87 B.R. 779, 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1988),
affd sub nom. PBGC v. LTV Corp., 875 F.2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1989), reo'd on other
grounds, 496 U.S. 633 (1990) (discussing legislative history of 1986 ERISA
amendments)).
32 A-T-O, Inc. v. PBGC, 634 F.2d 1013, 1021 (6th Cir. 1980).
33 Id.
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C. INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION
In contrast to the above laundry list of ways in which a corpo-
ration can voluntarily seek the termination of its pension obliga-
tions, ERISA provides a method by which the PBGC can, on its
own initiative, seek the termination of a plan in order to prevent
continued losses to either the employees of the plan or to the
long-term viability of the PBGC reserves themselves 4.3 There are
four main ways in which a plan becomes eligible for a section
1342 involuntary termination:3 5
(1) The corporation might simply have not contributed the
minimum funds as required by ERISA under section 412 of the
IRC; 3 6
(2) The PBGC has determined that the plan "will be unable to
pay benefits when due;"3 7
(3). A distribution of greater than $10,000 to a corporate in-
sider, as defined by section 1322(b) (6) of ERISA, has been made
which renders the plan underfunded; 38 or perhaps most
importantly,
(4) "the possible long-run loss of the [PBGC] with respect to
the plan may reasonably be expected to increase unreasonably if
the plan is not terminated. 39
Once the PBGC has made the determination that the plan
should be involuntarily terminated pursuant to any of the above
four criteria, the agency then begins the termination proceed-
ings by notifying the plan sponsor as well as the representatives
of the plan employees.40
While the PBGC is afforded great latitude in making and en-
forcing its decision to pursue an involuntary termination, the
decision is nonetheless subject to at least modest judicial re-
view.4 As a federal agency, the PBGC is afforded substantial dis-
cretion under the Administrative Procedures Act. 42  The
reviewing court shall set aside the agency's determination only if
it is found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law."'43 The court also is pre-
34 29 U.S.C.A. § 1342 (West 2005).
35 Id. § 1342(a).
36 Id. § 1342(a)(1).
37 Id. § 1342(a) (2).
38 Id. § 1342(a) (3).
39 Id. § 1342(a) (4).
40 Id. § 1342(d) (2).
41 Id. § 1342(c).
42 See 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2) (West 2005).
43 Id. § 706(2) (A).
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cluded from substituting "its judgment for that of the agency"4 4
and "must defer to 'the informed discretion of the responsible
federal agenc[y],"' especially when the agency action in ques-
tion is one that requires a high level of technical knowledge or
subject matter expertise.4 5 In essence, in involuntary termina-
tion review proceedings, the PBGC must only show that it
"reached its decision on the basis of a reasonable accommoda-
tion of the policies underlying ERISA."46
This, in practical terms, asks simply whether Congress has
given direct guidance on the subject, in which case it must be
followed, or alternatively, where the issue is not discussed,
whether the agency has taken action that is not otherwise imper-
missible.47 This "Chevron Doctrine" therefore conveys great dis-
cretion upon the PBGC, as many of the express grants of power
are defined in vague terms, especially given the detailed and ex-
pansive nature of the subject matter with which the agency con-
tends.4" Even a careful reading of the Congressional debate
surrounding the passage of ERISA gives neither the PBGC, plan
administrators, nor the courts charged with blessing agency de-
cisions much guidance as to Congress's exact intent regarding
the furthest reaches of PBGC authority.4"
Further, viewing the discretion afforded the PBGC must be
done through the lens of the "conflicting duties" of the agency's
"mission:"5 0
(1) to encourage the continuation and maintenance of volun-
tary private pension plans for the benefit of their participants,
(2) to provide for the timely and uninterrupted payment of
pension benefits to participants . . . and
44 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
45 Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 375 (1989) (quoting
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976)).
46 Rettig v. PBGC, 744 F.2d 133, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
47 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
48 Id. at 843-44.
4) See Rettig, 744 F.2d at 142-45 (quoting portion of the Legis. History of the
Employee Ret. Income Sec. Act of 1974, Subcomm. on Labor of the S. Comm. on
Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (citing 120 Cong. Rec.
29931 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams)), reprinted in Ill. Legis. History 4741.
5) Ass'n of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO v. PBGC, No. Civ.A. 05-103GESH,
2006 WL 89829, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2006).
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(3) to maintain premiums established by [PBGC] under sec-
tion 1306 of this title at the lowest level consistent with carrying
out its obligations under this subchapter.51
Any duty on the part of the PBGC to protect its own solvency,
and thereby prevent the need for a taxpayer-funded bailout of
its obligations, must be inferred either from the duty to provide
for continued payments to plan beneficiaries or from the "con-
tinuation" of voluntary private pension plans.52
A conflict between its express duty to plan participants and to
the continued solvency of the fund, therefore, is apparent. Sev-
eral courts have quoted the D.C. Circuit position that the agency
is to "resolve the inherent tension created by the statute by 'ac-
commodat[ing] the conflicting policies underlying ERISA."' 55
This invariably will lead to occasions where the agency's need to
protect its own long-term viability will override its statutorily de-
fined purpose of protecting individual pensioners.54 Such diffi-
cult balancing-test decisions are exactly the type of questions
which the Supreme Court, in referring to the PBGC, has said
must be left to the agency itself, despite the partially self-inter-
ested nature of the PBGC's decision.55 This balancing act, in
which the PBGC must continually engage, and its effects on the
PBGC administration of terminated pension plans and airline
pre-bankruptcy filing planning are discussed in Part II.
D. EFFECTS OF AIRLINE PLAN TERMINATION ON THE PBGC
The events of 9/11 and the long-term effects of the country's
progressively aging workforce on the healthcare and pension
obligations of America's oldest and largest traditional employers
have radically changed the outlook for the United States pen-
sion system's long-term solvency. The termination of tradition-
ally defined benefit plans, whether distress or involuntary, is
having a tremendous effect on the PBGC. But to understand
exactly how these terminations translate from company-owned
51 29 U.S.C.A. § 1302(a) (West 2005).
52 See id.
53 Ass'n of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO, 2006 WL 89829, at *4 (quoting Ret-
tig v. PBGC, 744 F.2d 133, 135 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
54 See id.
55 PBGC v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651-52 (1990); accord Piech v. PBGC, 744
F.2d 156, 161 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Although it may in many ways be desirable for
plan participants to have a trustee who is prepared to advocate their interests in
opposition to the PBGC, Congress has evidently not envisioned such a role for
the plan trustee").
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liabilities to PBGC-owned liabilities and how much liability is ac-
tually incurred by the agency, one must look at the mechanisms
by which the transfers take place.
As an initial matter, the PBGC assumes only those obligations
that are considered "guaranteed. '56 For 2005, the maximum an-
nual guaranteed pension benefit for plans terminated in 2005
was $45,613.68. 57 For employees that earned relatively high
wages, including many airline employees such as pilots and
mechanics, this figure is often far less than that originally guar-
anteed under the terms of their pension plan. 58 The effect on
the total funding requirement due to the stripping away of this
portion which is not "guaranteed" can be dramatic. 59 For exam-
ple, upon bankruptcy court approval of United Airlines' request
to terminate its pension plans on May 10, 2005, per the require-
ments of a distress termination, United's obligation to provide
benefits for its pilots and mechanics unions was nullified.6 ° At
that time, United's pension obligations were underfunded by an
incredible $9.8 billion. 61 Due to the PBGC's maximum benefit
limitation, however, the total obligation accepted by the PBGC
was $6.6 billion, resulting in a present value net loss of benefits
to member pensioners of $3.2 billion.62
It must also be noted that the PBGC maintains its balance
sheet according to United States Generally Accepted Account-
ing Principles ("GAAP"). 6" GAAP requires an accounting entity
to record liabilities currently that are reasonably certain.6 4 The
PBGC, therefore, includes a reasonably probable termination in
its accounting data as of the date on which the agency makes the
determination that the liability is reasonably certain, that is,
when the agency becomes reasonably certain that the plan will
be terminated, and in an amount for which the agency believes
56 PBGC FAQ supra note 7.
57 Am. Acad. of Actuaries, PBGC and United Airlines: How Does United's Termina-
tion Affect the PBGC Deficit? (2005), available at http://www.actuary.org/pdf/pen-






63 PBGC FAQ supra note 7.
64 USING CASH FLOW INFORMATION AND PRESENT VALUE IN ACCOUNTING MEA-
SUREMENTS, Statement of Fin. Accounting Concepts No. 7 (Fin. Accounting Stan-
dards Bd. 2000).
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it will be responsible. 65 The PBGC, in the case of United Air-
lines, included $16.9 billion for its expected liability for United's
"certain probable terminations. ' 66 The agency has therefore al-
ready booked the expected liabilities with respect to the plans of
United, US Airways, and Delta, even though those plans have
not been officially terminated by the PBGC or a bankruptcy
judge.6 v Ironically, because the PBGC is not allowed to book
uncertain assets that they might acquire upon plan terminations
under current Financial Accounting Standards Board standards,
any subsequent involuntary termination or agreement with the
airlines to consent to distress termination, will actually result in
an increase in the PBGC's accounting solvency.68
Any positives which may be gleaned from examining the
method by which the PBGC accounts for pension shortfalls,
however, are dwarfed by the magnitude of the liabilities the air-
lines are foisting upon the agency. Total PBGC exposure to
pension underfunding, as determined by total United States
pension-plan underfunding at the end of fiscal year 2005, re-
mained in excess of $450 billion.69 While the official net-pre-
sent-value capital deficit at the PBGC declined from $23.3
billion in 2004 to $22.8 billion in 2005, this figure only masks
the true impending insolvency of the agency.7 0 The agency's
calculation of "'reasonably possible' exposure" increased from
$96 billion in 2004 to $108 billion in 2005.71 Notably, the air-
lines make up a large portion of the liabilities the PBGC expects
to incur. 72 At Delta Airlines and Northwest Airlines alone, em-
ployees are expected to lose $5.1 billion in expected pension
benefits, while the PBGC is expecting to incur over $11.2 billion
in losses from these two plan providers alone.73
65 Id.
66 PBGC and United Airlines, supra note 57.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Press Release, PBGC, PBGC Releases Fiscal Year 2005 Financial Results




72 Bradley Bett, Executive Dir., PBGC, Statement on Airline Bankruptcy Filings




Similarly, the PBGC agreed to assent to a distress-termination
request by US Airways. Under the terms of the US Airways
request, employees lost $200 million in expected pension bene-
fits, while the PBGC assumed control over the corporation's
three plans, which had combined liabilities in excess of com-
bined assets to the order of $2.3 billion.75 Commenting on the
assumption of ever-larger pension-plan shortfalls, the Executive
Director for the PBGC, Bradley Belt, stated that while the
agency would "protect the pension benefits of US Airways' work-
ers and retirees," he worried that "the pension safety net is badly
frayed" and was in need of serious modification. 6
In contrast with the Delta and Northwest distress termination,
bankruptcy-driven plan assumptions, the PBGC attempted to
proactively negotiate a settlement with United Airlines for the
termination of their four defined benefit plans.7 7 Under the
terms of the settlement, the PBGC would accept a twenty per-
cent equity position in the reorganized United Airlines in ex-
change for agreeing to "involuntarily" terminate each of the
United plans. 78 The propriety of the PBGC engaging in such
bartering is the subject of Part II, while an analysis of the long-
term effectiveness of this strategy is the subject of Part III.
Regardless of the accounting methods used to describe, or
perhaps disguise, the true nature of this country's looming pen-
sion crisis, it is apparent that massive airline pension defaults are
a large contributor to the problem. Estimates of the eventual
combined price tag for all the to-be-terminated airline plans are
as high as $31 billion.79
74 Press Release, PBGC, PBGC Takes $2.3 Billion Pension Loss from US Air-




77 Press Release, PBGC, PBGC Reaches Pension Settlement with United Air-
lines (Apr. 22, 2005) (on file with author), available at http://wvw.pbgc.gov/
media/news-archive/2005/pr05-36.h tml.
78 See Marilyn Adams, United Leaves Bankruptcy Behind, USA TODAY, Feb. 1,
2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/2006-02-01-
united-bankruptcy-x.htm.
79 David Field Washington, Pension Burden Stacks Up, AIRLINE Bus., Jan. 1, 2005,
at 16, available at http://www.flightglobal.com/Articles/Article.aspx?iArticleID-
191455&PrinterFriendly=true.
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II. WHY THE RECENT CHANGES TO THE BANKRUPTCY
CODE AND RECENT COURT DECISIONS EXERCISING
OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PBGC
MISSED GOLDEN OPPORTUNITIES TO DEAL
WITH THE LOOMING PENSION CRISIS
This section examines the changes to the Bankruptcy Code
made by the recent amendments contained in the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act ("BAPCPA") as
they might affect airlines filing subsequent to the general effec-
tive date of October 17, 2005. Additionally, this section will
show how substantive changes were made to the Bankruptcy
Code to provide added protection to certain special interests,
such as landlords and utilities, which if similarly applied to the
PBGC might have dramatically improved its financial situation.
Finally, this section details recent court rulings that, by al-
lowing the PBGC to piece together negotiated settlements with
bankrupt airlines terminating their pension plans, are prolong-
ing the inevitable reckoning of the entire pension benefit guar-
antee system and thereby increasing the size of the eventual
bailout that all American taxpayers must shoulder.
A. CHANGES MADE (AND NOT MADE) TO THE BANKRUPTCY
CODE WHICH WILL AFFECT AIRLINES AND
THE PBGC's EFFORTS TO SURVIVE
The recent changes to the Bankruptcy Code were passed, one
might naturally (and naively) assume from its title, in order to
prevent widespread abuse of bankruptcy protection as well as to
better protect consumers. Subsequent to its passage, however, it
has been met with scathing criticism."0 At least one sitting bank-
ruptcyjudge made the following remarks:
[t]hose responsible for the passing of the Act did all in their
power to avoid the proffered input from sitting United States
Bankruptcy Judges, various professors of bankruptcy law at distin-
guished universities, and many professional associations filled
with the best of the bankruptcy lawyers in the country as to the
perceived flaws in the Act. This is because the parties pushing
the passage of the Act had their own agenda. It was apparently
an agenda to make more money off the backs of the consumers
in this country."1
80 In re Sosa, 336 B.R. 113, 114 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005).
81 Id.
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Whatever the actual motivation for passage of the Act, and
whether the proclivity of airlines to routinely seek bankruptcy
protection was a factor, it is undeniable that substantive changes
were made to the Code which affect not only consumers but also
large corporations, and in some instances affect the airlines as
well.
For instance, under prior provisions of the Bankruptcy Code,
a debtor-in-possession or trustee had considerable latitude in its
decision to either assume or reject pre-petition lease obliga-
tions.8 2 Under formerly applicable provisions, the trustee had
sixty days in which to decide whether to accept or reject such a
lease obligation.8"
This procedure has drastically changed under the BAPCPA
amendments. 84 The debtor now has 120 days in which to make
its decision to accept or reject its pre-petition leases.85 Impor-
tantly, however, the trustee can request only a single 90-day ex-
tension.86 Following this maximum period of 210 days, the
trustee can only seek an extension with the approval of the cred-
itor/landlord-an unlikely event to say the least.87 After the ex-
piration of this 210-day period, the lease is deemed rejected as a
matter of law, and the trustee must vacate the premises immedi-
ately, even without further court action.88
The amendments go further, however, and alter the standing
of an initially assumed lease.8 9 If a trustee later rejects or avoids
a lease that was initially assumed, the creditor/landlord gains
administrative priority standing for damages for his rejected
lease, effectively moving all of his claims up the priority ladder
and in front of all general unsecured creditors. 90 Moreover, the
creditor/landlord then becomes entitled to all remaining pay-
ments under the lease as an unsecured claimant.9'
Even better for commercial creditors/landlords, a new provi-
sion prevents the standard automatic stay provision from affect-
ing a continuing action to evict a tenant where the landlord has
82 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(d) (West 2005).
83 Id. § 365(d)(1).
84 Id. § 365(d).
85 Id. § 365(d) (4) (A) (i).
86 Id. § 365(d) (4) (B) (i).
87 Id. § 365(d) (4) (B) (ii).
88 Id. § 365(d) (4) (A).
89 Id. § 503(b) (7).
90 Id.
91 Id. § 502 (b) (6).
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already obtained a judgment prior to the filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition.9 2 Whereas a debtor could seek protection of its
facilities via the automatic stay provision of a traditional bank-
ruptcy filing, a company now must diligently manage its pre-
bankruptcy activities to make sure that any essential facilities are
not in arrears.
It is unclear exactly how these changes will affect airline bank-
ruptcy proceedings any more than the typical business/commer-
cial debtor. The changes will obviously make it considerably
easier for a landlord who deals with airline tenants to either be
compensated for the use of his premises, or alternatively, to re-
acquire the premises so that it can be relet in a much shorter
time, thereby improving the creditor's profitability. What is
clear, however, is that the commercial real estate lobby, particu-
larly commercial retail landlords, effectively lobbied Congress to
have their position in a bankruptcy proceeding greatly
improved.
In another, somewhat obscure, portion of the BAPCPA
amendments, another ever-present participant in bankruptcy
proceedings fought to have its lot improved. Utility providers
are afforded increased protection under BAPCPA and are given
rather unique abilities to protect their unsecured claims.94 A
new provision was added to the pre-existing section 366 that, in
effect, gives a utility provider complete discretion over deciding
what constitutes adequate protection for purposes of allowing a
debtor in possession to continue to use the utility's services.95
Unlike every other creditor involved in the bankruptcy proceed-
ing, the utility provider is allowed to determine whether the
debtor's offer to protect the provider constitutes adequate pro-
tection, and if not, to refuse to provide services to the debtor
without any intervention from the court.96 It is up to the debtor
to request a hearing to contest the decision by the utility pro-
vider to terminate or otherwise alter its services to the debtor.97
One of the first cases to discuss this new power conferred
upon utility providers was In re Lucre, Inc.8 A local exchange
carrier providing telecommunication services to the Michigan
92 Id. § 362(b) (22).
93 Id.




98 333 B.R. 151 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2005).
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market filed an emergency motion with the court to extend the
automatic stay and thereby prevent the local power company
and its upstream and downstream communication-facility prov-
iders from terminating services to the competitive local ex-
change carrier." The court took a firm position based on the
explicit language of section 366(c) and held that the new statute
expressly states that the only way in which an injunction against
a utility provider can be extended is for either the utility pro-
vider to accept the adequate-assurance offer of the debtor or for
the debtor to accept the adequate assurance that is requested by
the utility provider.'0 0 This appears to greatly enhance the util-
ity's bargaining power because the utility can effectively set the
terms of service and then wait for the debtor to decide whether
it can find adequate funding to guarantee payment for its utili-
ties, which are often entirely indispensable to continued opera-
tions. "' The court does soften its holding slightly, however, by
suggesting that the utility provider "might" have an obligation to
negotiate for adequate assurance in good faith. 1 2
Regardless of how bankruptcy courts as a whole eventually de-
cide how much of an upper hand to give to utilities in this unu-
sual situation, it is clear that debtors as a whole are now in a
position where they cannot seek immediate court intervention
at the first hint of creditor displeasure. Whereas a recalcitrant
debtor could previously count on the goodwill of the typical
bankruptcy judge wanting to preserve as much of the estate as
possible to allow for long term recovery for as many unsecured
creditors as possible, it now appears that this judicial discretion
has been severely limited by express statutory instructions to
steer clear of the suddenly sacrosanct turf of utility providers.
As was the case with the increase in bargaining power for com-
mercial lessors, there is no question that this change favors cred-
itors over would-be airline debtors-in-possession. Airlines are
generally extremely capital intensive enterprises and depend
heavily on leased equipment, leased facilities, and enormous en-
ergy, telecommunications, and other utility expenditures.'0 3
What is important to consider, however, is not the change in the
99 Id. at 152-53.
100 Id. at 154.
101 See id.
102 Id.
103 For example, American Airlines ended its fiscal year 2004 with over $19
billion in property, plants, and equipment. AMR Corp., 2004 Annual Report
(Form 10-K), at 44 (Feb. 25, 2005). Delta Airlines ended its fiscal year 2004 with
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relative positions of property lessors and utility providers, but
rather the approach that Congress (no doubt with the help of
associated interest group lobbyists) took with these isolated spe-
cial interests.
If Congress had wanted to provide the PBGC with greater lev-
erage in bankruptcy proceedings, it could have taken the same
approach and provided either stronger priority, as it did with
commercial lessors, or presumptively authoritative control over
the setting of adequate-protection terms, as it did with utility
providers. While neither alone would be sufficient to prevent
the currently insolvent airlines from unloading the pension obli-
gations onto the PBGC, some alteration to the PBGC's standing
in a bankruptcy proceeding is vital if the agency is to have any
chance of survival without a massive infusion of federal assis-
tance. That Congress chose not to include any such provision to
specifically benefit the PBGC speaks to the body's lack of con-
cern for the growing problem, an insufficient understanding of
the nature or severity of the problem, an unwillingness to con-
front the issue head-on where little public focus has been di-
rected at the issue, or some combination thereof. In any event,
the passing of the first significant update to the nation's bank-
ruptcy code in more than twenty-five years, without any mention
of the PBGC or pension insurance, and in the face of the swell-
ing deficits at the federally funded agency, is without question a
disappointing lost opportunity.
B. RECENT COURT DECISIONS CONCERNING THE PBGC's
ABILITY TO TERMINATE PLANS THROUGH DISTRESS
AND INVOLUNTARY TERMINATIONS
Congress was unwilling to give the PBGC greater distribution
priority or bargaining power in the most recent amendments to
the Bankruptcy Code. However, the courts have responded by
giving the PBGC a very wide berth in its decision-making author-
ity, perhaps as much in an effort to allow the agency to proac-
tively protect itself in the face of mounting losses as in an effort
to faithfully interpret the agency's statutory grant of power.
This section will describe the reasoning of court decisions in the
most recent PBGC airline termination cases, which have unmis-
takably shown a willingness to let the PBGC expand its ability to
negotiate plan terminations with the airlines that are as PBGC-
over $16.5 billion in property, plant, and equipment. Delta Air Lines, Inc., An-
nual Report (Form 10-K), at F-3 (March 10, 2005).
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favorable as could be expected under the circumstances. In do-
ing so, however, the courts may have given the agency just
enough authority to prevent current account deficits from ban-
krupting the PBGC itself, possibly at the expense of a viable
long-term solution and public awareness of the growing underly-
ing financial time bomb.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
has been particularly willing to defer to the PBGC. In Adams v.
PBGC, the court allowed the PBGC to draft a particularly novel
settlement agreement in its section 1342 involuntary termina-
tion of Trans World Airlines' ("TWA") two retirement plans.' 4
TWA's plans were underfunded by approximately $1.1 billion at
the time of the settlement agreement.0 5 In an effort to save the
plans, or at least to lessen the eventual underfunded liability,
the PBGC entered an agreement with TWA whereby a third-
party investor would agree to fund the plans' ongoing contribu-
tion obligations in exchange for TWA notes that would vest if
the airline were able to successfully reorganize its operations
and become profitable.' 0 6 The plans were eventually terminated
nine years after the initial settlement agreement between TWA
and the PBGC.'" 7 Airline employees whose pensions were re-
duced from the levels stated in their collective bargaining agree-
ment with TWA sued TWA and PBGC, claiming that such an
involuntary settlement exceeded the statutory authority of the
PBGC and amounted to nothing more than an attempt on the
part of both the third-party guarantor and the PBGC to evade
their responsibilities at the expense of the plan members.' 8
The court found, however, that the PBGC was expressly au-
thorized to engage in "liability settlements" under section
1367.' The court went on to say that "'federal law authorizes
the PBGC to enter into settlement agreements like the one chal-
lenged in this case,'" citing section 1362(b)(3) as an express
grant of authority."' In so holding, the D.C. court was merely
following clear and incontrovertible precedent laid down by the
Supreme Court itself which allows the PBGC almost unfettered
discretion in brokering settlements and providing what must be
104 Adams v. PBGC, 332 F. Supp. 2d 231, 235-39 (D.D.C. 2004).
105 Id. at 233.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 233-34.
108 Id.
00 Id. at 236.
J0 Id. (quoting Allied Pilots Ass'n v. PBGC, 334 F.3d 93, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
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considered immunity from subsequent liability to settlement
participants if the agency believes it is in its best interest to do
so.
111
That the Supreme Court would hold that a federal agency
should be given discretion is not troubling. That the Court is
basing such an extremely broad grant of power to the agency on
the language used in the statute might well be. Section 1367
merely states that the PBGC "is authorized to make arrange-
ments with contributing sponsors . . . including arrangements
for deferred payment of amounts... and for such periods as the
[PBGC] deems equitable and appropriate."'1 12  Section
1362(b) (3) grants the agency the ability to "agree to alternative
arrangements for the satisfaction of liability to the [PBGC]."11
Admittedly, nothing in either of these grants of discretionary au-
thority limits the ability of the PBGC to enter settlement agree-
ments.1 14 One wonders, therefore, whether the Supreme Court
is implicitly authorizing the PBGC to go to the limits of due pro-
cess, and if not, what limitations would apply, assuming the
agency was acting within the pension insurance and guaranty
context.
A very recent United States District Court for the District of
Columbia decision further expounded on this expansive grant
of discretion in a case involving similar circumstances at another
troubled airline. 5 As mentioned previously, United Airlines
entered bankruptcy protection in 2002. During the initial bank-
ruptcy proceedings, the PBGC seemed to be attempting to pre-
vent United from terminating its pension obligations through a
traditional debtor-led distress termination." 6 The agency ap-
parently resisted efforts by the airline to seek court approval for
cessation of even its then-current monthly contribution obliga-
tions throughout 2004 and 2005.117 The PBGC appeared to be
unsuccessful in its efforts, however, as United's request to sus-
M See Nachman Corp. v. PBGC, 446 U.S. 359, 367 (1980) ("[Congress]
grant[ed] the PBGC discretion to arrange reasonable terms for the payment of
[ERISA] liability"); see also Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996)
("[p]lan sponsors who alter the terms of a plan do not fall into the category of
fiduciaries").
112 29 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West 2005).
113 Id. § 1362(b) (3).
114 See id.
115 Ass'n of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO v. PBGC, No. Civ.A. 05-1036ESH,
2006 WL 89829 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2006).
116 Id. at *2.
117 Id.
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pend all contributions to its plans was granted by the presiding
bankruptcy court judge.'i1
The reality of the situation, however, is somewhat more com-
plicated. Throughout the early part of 2005, the PGBC ap-
peared to continue its opposition to any efforts by United to
terminate its current or future obligations." 9 Such efforts in-
cluded opposition to United's June 30, 2005, motion to termi-
nate its plan through court-sanctioned distress termination,
which included a brief filed with the court that argued that any
attempt by United to terminate its plan was "premature" without
further information showing that the plans were not salvage-
able. 12' Even the Executive Director of the PBGC, Bradley Belt,
sent a written response to a contemporaneous flight attendants'
union proposal to salvage the plans, saying that the agency
"'continue[d] to believe that the interests of the participants
and the pension insurance program would best be served by the
continuance" of the pension plan.'
2
'
In behind-the-scenes negotiations, however, the PBGC had
been in settlement talks with United as early as February,
2005.122 An agreement between United and the PBGC was
reached on April 22, 2005. 12' The court was called upon by the
union to declare the settlement beyond the scope of the
agency's authority, and by the PBGC in a subsequently filed mo-
tion to declare the plan involuntarily terminated. 124
The court sided entirely with the PBGC. 125 In doing so, it
pointed to language in ERISA authorizing the agency "to termi-
nate a pension plan based on a 'possible long-run loss.' ' 121 The
court went on importantly to state the following:
the agency need not have perfect information regarding either
the exact amount of increased liability or the probability that the
agency will have to assume this liability. In this case, PBGC staff
assessed the risk and costs to the agency of delaying termination.
Armed with those figures, the agency chose, as it was entitled to
do, to invoke its power to involuntarily terminate under [section]
1342 instead of waiting for the resolution of a [section] 1341 ter-
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at *2.
121 Id.
122 d. at *3
123 Id.
124 Id. at *9.
125 Id.
126 Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (4) (2005) (emphasis added)).
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mination. Such determinations regarding the amount of loss the
agency is willing to risk are precisely the sort of discretionary de-
cisions [with which a court should not interfere]. 127
This case is perhaps more troubling than Adams.128 In Adams,
the court was willing to allow the agency to enter a settlement
based upon facts known or estimable at the time of the decision,
where the settlement terms among the airline, the third-party
financier, and the agency were publicly disclosed. 129 If the plan
members adversely affected by the settlement agreement be-
tween the pension sponsor and the agency objected to any terms
as being inequitable, recourse (however limited it might have
been, given the overwhelming deferential nature of review prac-
ticed by the district court) would have been possible either via
objection to the overreaching by the agency or sponsor in con-
travention of the express terms of ERISA or through a sheer
plea to equitable considerations.130
The decision in Association of Flight Attendants is more discon-
certing, not because of the ultimate decision reached by the
agency or the amount of the underfunded liability assumed, but
rather because of the methods employed by the PBGC in its set-
tlement negotiations and communications with affected par-
ties.13 1 Congress' grant of power to the agency, its breadth aptly
described by the court in Association of Flight Attendants, cannot
possibly extend indefinitely without regard to the interests of di-
rectly affected parties.1 12 It must be remembered that the
agency's statutorily defined purpose includes the obligations "to
encourage the continuation and maintenance of voluntary pri-
vate pension plans for the benefit of their participants" and "to pro-
vide for the timely and uninterrupted payment of pension
benefits to participants .... ."" Privately negotiating "involun-
tary" termination settlements that adversely affect plan partici-
pants while publicly decrying plan sponsor attempts to self-
terminate their plans seems to be overweighting the agency's
other obligation "to maintain premiums... at the lowest level
"3134
127 Id.
128 Adams v. PBGC, 332 F. Supp. 2d 231 (D.D.C. 2004).
129 See id. at 234.
130 See id. at 235-37.
131 Ass'n of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO, 2006 WL 89829.
132 Id. at *9.
133 29 U.S.C.A. § 1302(a)(1)-(2) (West 2005) (emphasis added).
134 Id. § 1302(a) (3).
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That is certainly not to say that the agency is not vigilantly
pursuing the course of action it most feels will best protect the
total pool of pension plan capital under its supervision. On the
contrary, Part III of this comment will attempt to show that,
given the constraints placed on the PBGC by its mandate from
Congress, the current Bankruptcy Code, and inefficiencies en-
demic in any system of government-sponsored interruption of
market forces, especially with respect to insurance products, the
PBGC is unable to substantively improve the condition of the
pension guarantee program through any means other than in
direct and oftentimes surreptitious bartering with plan sponsors
to negotiate a pension plan termination and bankruptcy reor-
ganization plan that, while not explicitly permitted by the Bank-
ruptcy Code, improves the agency's priority status enough to
acquire some assets to offset the acquired plan liabilities. Had
Congress taken the opportunity presented by the first re-write of
the Bankruptcy Code in more than twenty-five years to give the
PBGC statutorily-mandated higher priority, the agency would
not be forced to achieve that goal through other means. Had
courts not been willing to allow the PBGC to conduct its affairs
by such covert means, then perhaps the issue would have been
brought to the forefront for more deliberate discussion.
III. STRATEGIES FOR REPAIRING THE NATION'S
PENSION SYSTEM
There have been nearly as many recommendations for fixing
the PBGC as there have been academics who have examined the
agency. Recommendations include increasing the rates charged
by the PBGC for its insuring of plan premiums, modifying to the
bankruptcy priority system (as discussed in Part II), and novel
initiatives such as changing the entire insurance system to a
more market-based program. First, this section will describe the
manner in which the PBGC is currently funded to provide a
backdrop for the changes that have been previously recom-
mended. Next, it will examine each of the proposed solutions,
and ultimately find that while each might be able to incre-
mentally reduce the PBGC's funding shortfall, none is able to
make the system solvent in today's operating environment. Fi-
nally, this section will end with a solution to the problem that is
actually no solution at all: terminating the PBGC, and dividing
the losses that would result from its termination among all par-
ties involved, including the plan sponsor's equity holders, other
creditors, and pension plan members, and ultimately the taxpay-
3972006] PBGC
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
ers. Retirement plan insurance, if it is a viable service, must
then be provided by market participants who have both an in-
centive to monitor the creditworthiness and behavior of their
plan and to sponsor customers and capital at risk to make sure
that their decisions are rational in light of their own self interest.
A. THE EXISTING PBGC FUNDING MECHANISM
The PBGC is not a federally funded insurance program.1"5
ERISA requires that the PBGC be financed solely through the
premiums it charges for its insurance services, the recoveries
that it makes from plans that were voluntarily terminated
through standard or distress termination, the funds recovered
in involuntary terminations, and the interest earned from the
investment of these funds.136 The agency does have a $100 mil-
lion line of credit with the Treasury Department, which gives the
federal government some direct exposure, however limited. 137
ERISA explicidy limits the federal government's exposure to
PBGC claims only to trust funds held by the agency for the bene-
fit of plan members. 1 3
While this would seem to relieve the federal government of
potential long-term liability for PBGC deficits, the White House
itself so much as admits that the responsibilities of the PBGC
eventually will fall on the general revenue fund of the United
States. 139 Government Accounting Office figures for total gov-
ernment debt included $71 billion for liabilities of the PBGC. 140
Few would argue that the government will be required to shoul-
der the load when, not if, the PBGC finally becomes unable to
make ongoing payments on its assumed pension plan
obligations.
As mentioned earlier, one of the primary sources of PBGC
revenue is the premium base collected from ongoing plans.
The agency actually collects two distinct types of premiums.
First, plans are required to pay a flat rate fee, currently $19 per
135 Colloquium, Wendy Kiska et. al, Understanding & Controlling PBGC's Risk
Exposure, Nw. Univ. Colloquium Series: Law & Econ. (2004), http://www.law.
northwestern.edu/colloquium/law-economics/Lucas.pdf.
136 29 U.S.C.A. § 1303.
137 Id. § 1305(c).
138 Id. § 1303.
139 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANA-
LYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOV'T 231 (2005).
140 Id.
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pension plan member per year.' 4 ' Second, those plans that are
underfunded as of the close of the prior year must pay an addi-
tional $9 variable rate premium to compensate for the added
risk they pose to the fund. 4 2 This flat rate fee with an addi-
tional variable rate risk premium, however, is far too crude to
allow the PBGC to adequately allocate funding responsibility
based upon risk, as any viable insurance program must do.
Amazingly, ERISA imposes this pricing scheme upon the PBGC,
mandating that the agency will employ rates that "shall be uni-
form for all plans."'43
B. INCREASING BASE AND VARIABLE RATES
TO SHORE UP THE PBGC
Recommendations to allow the PBGC to charge higher, and
market based, rates have been made for some time.' 44 The Di-
rector of the Congressional Budget Office recently passionately
advocated a change to higher, risk-based premiums. 1 45 The
PBGC's Executive Director, Bradley Belt, has made numerous
requests to Congress to alter the premium structure of the
PBGC.'46 Belt noted that UAL continued to pay (and often-
times did not pay) the same flat rate premium as highly solvent
corporations, "[even though its] credit rating has [only] been
[good enough for] junk bonds status and its pension un-
derfunded by more than $5 billion on a termination basis since
at least 2000 ....
As should be obvious to anyone familiar with basic economics,
it is inconceivable that any system which sets a flat rate for an
insurance plan, without any regard to market risks in the system
in general and firm specific risk in particular, can function prop-
1,41 29 U.S.C.A. § 1306(a) (3) (A) (i).
142 Id. § 1306(a) (3) (E) (ii).
143 Id. § 1306 (a) (1).
144 Vineeta Anand, New PBGC Head Set to Fix System, PENSIONS AND INVESrMEN[S
ONLINE, May 17, 2004, at 2, http://wvw.pionline.com/article.cms?articlelD=
45336&issueDate=2004-05-17&ht=. (Belt believes the PBGC must "charge varying
premiums depending on the risks plan sponsors present to the agency, measured
by the companies' credit ratings, asset allocation of the pension plans, exposure
to interest rate changes and structural risk in a particular industry sector").
145 PBGC's Unfunded Pension Liabilities: Will Taxpayers Have to Pay the Bill?: Hear-
ing Before the H. Comm. on Budget, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Douglas
Holtz-Eakin, Dir., Cong. Budget Office).
146 The Effect of Federal Bankruptcy and Pension Policy on the Financial Situation of
the Airlines: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 108th Cong.
(2004) (testimony of Bradley D. Belt, Executive Dir., PBGC).
147 Id.
2006] PBGC 399
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
erly. Firms would recoil at a flat rate price set high enough to
actually keep the entire plan solvent. Those firms healthy
enough to seek insurance for their plan in private markets
would do so, leaving only weak firms which cannot find insur-
ance from private firms to weigh upon the remainder of the
plan base. 148 After healthy firms fled the system, the average flat
rate price capable of sustaining the remaining plans would be so
high as to push the remaining plan sponsors into insolvency.
Firm management contemplating the creation of a defined ben-
efit plan (few as they might be) might well be breaching their
fiduciary duty to their shareholders by entering into such a mo-
rass. 141 Moving to a higher flat rate would therefore be the
worst of both worlds: healthy firms would be forced to flee the
system, thereby depriving the PBGC of much needed revenues
from firms unlikely to later burden the system with un-
derfunded liabilities and pushing weak firms further into
insolvency.
Even a variable rate that takes into account the firm-specific
risk of each plan sponsor would ultimately fail in this environ-
ment. It seems equitable that firms that have the higher chance
of breaching their pension plan obligations should pay a higher
insurance rate in accordance with the higher likelihood of the
eventual PBGC assumption of liabilities, and some have sug-
gested that this is the answer to repairing the PBGC.150 Indeed,
it makes some sense that a firm would take into account the
added cost of variable rate premiums when deciding how and
whether to allocate funding for pension obligations.1 51 Healthy
firms would appreciate lower rates, but those firms that should
be charged significantly higher rates than the current $19 an-
nual premium given their firm-specific risk, financially unstable
by definition, would be unable to afford a premium commensu-
rate with their financial status. Moving to a variable rate regime,
therefore, would only force weak firms into bankruptcy.
Even if a variable rate premium increase designed to compen-
sate the PBGC for increased firm-specific risk were a proper
148 Nanette Byrnes & Davis Welch, The Benefits Trap, Bus. WL,July 19, 2004, at
64.
149 Id.
150 Phil Davies, Pensions in Peril, FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS: THE RE-
GION, June, 2005, http://woodrow.mpls.frb.fed.us/pubs/region/05-6/davies.
cfm?js=0.
15, Retirement Protection Act of 1993: Hearing on H.R. 3396 Before the Oversight Sub-
comm. on Ways and Means, 103rd Cong. (1993).
means to better allocate expense, the prevailing corporate pro-
tectionism in Congress would prevent such a change from being
made. One commentator succinctly stated her position: "If
Congress increases premiums to solve the PBGC's problems,
they would send a message to companies that are meeting their
pension obligations 'that not only do they have to pay for their
own pension benefits, at some point they will pay for the bene-
fits of their competitors.' "152 It is unclear from this statement
whether she and the senator whom she quoted understand that
multi-billion-dollar government bailouts come from people who
not only are paying their own expenses but also at some point
will have to pay for the benefits of others. 5 ' Another commen-
tator said that "if premiums are raised too much for employers
with well-funded plans, the attractiveness of offering defined
benefit plans will decrease."' 54 Perhaps that is exactly what
needs to happen.
C. A CHANGE IN THE PBGC's PRE- AND POST-PETITION
BANKRUPTCY PRIORITY STATUS
To understand why many commentators recommend that the
PBGC be given a higher priority status in bankruptcy proceed-
ings, it is important to know the current position the agency has
when a corporation seeks bankruptcy court protection. This
section will thus explain the agency's current position and then
comment on the recommendations that scholars have made for
improving it.
When an insolvent firm seeks bankruptcy protection, there is
a high likelihood that there will not be sufficient assets to satisfy
the claims of all of the corporation's secured and unsecured
creditors. Secured creditors are those that have claims against
not only the cash and cash equivalent positions of the debtor
but also against the debtor's specific assets that were encum-
bered with a lien in favor of the creditor in exchange for the
creditor lending the debtor capital. 5 5 As such, secured creditor
claims will be satisfied from the assets of the debtor before un-
152 Leigh Allyson Wolfe, Is Your Pension Safe? A Call for Reform of the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation and Protection of Pension Benefits, 24 Sw. U. L. REv. 145,
177 (1994) (quoting Hearings on the Ret. Act of 1933 Before the S. Comm. on Fin.,
103d Cong. 4 (1994) (statement of James M. Jeffords, U.S. Sen. from Vt.)).
153 See id.
154 Jerry Geisel, Liabilities Threatening Long-Term Future of PBGC, Bus. INs., Aug.
30, 2004, at T12.
155 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 506-507 (West 2005).
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secured creditors receive any distribution at all.' 56 Unsecured
creditors, however, are classified according to the type of claim
they are pressing against the debtor and the priority system that
Congress enacted in the Bankruptcy Code for economic as well
as policy reasons.'57 As such, the priority of a creditor's claim
often determines whether it is satisfied in full or left completely
out in the cold.158 To rise above all other general unsecured
creditors and have a reasonable chance of recovery, the PBGC
therefore must make sure that it has a lien against the debtor's
assets. 
1 59
Achieving this status under the current system, however, is
what many consider to be the root of the PBGC's problem in
today's bankruptcy system. 60 The PBGC has two options. First,
it can attempt to obtain a lien against the debtor's assets for un-
funded benefits owed to the plan.161 Alternatively, the PBGC can
seek a lien against the debtor's assets for the continuing contri-
butions that the plan sponsor owes to the plan but is not mak-
ing.162 The problem, however, is with the Bankruptcy Code's
automatic stay provision. 16  Once a debtor files a bankruptcy
petition, the automatic stay prevents "any act to create, perfect,
or enforce any lien against property of the estate.' ' 64
This puts the PBGC in an untenable position. If the agency
waits to see whether a plan sponsor is going to be able to main-
tain its plan and stay solvent or recover from its problems with
an infusion of outside capital, then the automatic-stay provision
of the Code will prevent it from seeking either a lien against the
assets of the debtor or an execution of a previously acquired
lien. Troubled companies have little reason to alert the PBGC
to their plans to enter bankruptcy; indeed, it would be impru-
dent for the management of the soon-to-be debtor-in-possession
to do anything that would give its creditors additional leverage
and secured positions against its assets, thereby weakening the
debtor's collateral position in any subsequent reorganization
plan. For its part, the PBGC cannot be blamed for not wanting
156 Id.
157 See id. § 507.
158 See id.
159 See id.
160 See Keating, Pension Insurance, supra note 27, at 90-92.
161 29 U.S.C.A. § 1362(b) (1) (West 2005).
162 Id.
163 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (4).
164 Id.
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to actively engage in the levying of possibly insolvent companies.
The government agency would be imprudent to begin pushing
companies into bankruptcy and involuntary termination pro-
ceedings given the large number of companies with hundreds of
thousands of employees teetering on the verge of insolvency.
Because of these issues, many have recommended giving the
PBGC elevated status in bankruptcy proceedings. As was dis-
cussed in Part II, Congress chose not to address the pension-
insurance underfunding problem in the 2005 amendments to
the Bankruptcy Code. Had they done so, perhaps the mounting
financial crisis would have been brought to the forefront and
dealt with in a more public forum.
On the other hand, it is not at all clear whether changing the
priority status of the PBGC would be the panacea that some
claim. The purpose of Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings is to
allow the debtor to reorganize its operations and emerge anew,
hopefully in the process sustaining some of the going concern
value of the business operations and preserving jobs for the
firm's employees. Administrative expenses, those creditor
claims that Congress has determined to be entitled to immedi-
ate payment, however, must be completely satisfied before the
company can emerge from bankruptcy protection. 6 5 If the
PBGC is to be afforded administrative expense status for its
claims, this would be an immense expense for which the reorga-
nizing corporation must account.166
Even if a revision to the Code were to label the PBGC's claims
as something other than an administrative expense, the fact of
the matter would remain that the bankrupt corporation would
need to address all of its pension plan deficiencies in some man-
ner before being allowed to continue in business. Given the
huge size of the deficiencies at today's domestic airlines, it is not
clear that it would be possible to finance such sums, whether in
a single lump sum payment or stretched out over many years,
and it would be a risky and dubious investment on the part of
would-be financiers to sink such large sums of capital into air-
lines that have not shown that they could be profitable, despite
the skyrocketing price of fuel.
165 Id. § 1129(a) (9) (A).
166 See id.
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D. "SUPERPRIORITY" STATUS FOR THE PBGC
A novel idea has been proposed by Professor Keating of the
University of Washington in St. Louis. Professor Keating would
grant "superpriority" to the PBGC's claims, both pre- and post-
petition, which would trump all other would-be creditors of the
bankrupt estate, regardless of whether these other creditors are
secured or unsecured. 67 Unlike the problem of trying to con-
vert a pre-petition debt into a post-petition secured claim, as in
the above suggestions to fashion a higher priority in bankruptcy,
Keating's proposal would solve the problem without mucking
up the traditional pre- and post-petition distinction by convey-
ing upon the PBGC a unique status.' 68
Further, the positioning of the PBGC before other creditors,
both secured and unsecured (it might still be possible, under a
slightly modified version of his proposal, to allow post-petition
creditors and lenders higher priority in order to allow the
debtor-in-possession access to vital post-petition funding oppor-
tunities), would remove the PBGC's burden of monitoring the
activities of the debtor, and place those burdens on the creditors
who now stand in the lower-ranked position formerly held by
the PBGC and other general unsecured creditors.'69 It could
certainly be argued that this burden should not be borne by
general creditors, but it is undeniable that creditors, landlords,
and lenders in the business of judging and valuing credit and
market risk as part of their normal operations are in a much
better position to perform this function than the PBGC. At
worst, the added costs of monitoring debtors and the additional
interest premiums associated with a lower bankruptcy priority
would be priced according to market mechanisms instead of ar-
bitrarily set (or not set) by a government agency.
It suffers, however, from the same main problem as the bank-
ruptcy modification proposals, that is, it places a larger burden
on businesses already suffering from bankruptcy proceedings.
Even worse, because of the proposed superpriority of the
PBGC's claims, there would be businesses completely unable to
reorganize due to the massive burden of underfunded pension
obligations. United Airlines, fresh out of bankruptcy, is a good
example. United's nearly $7 billion in unfunded obligations, if
required to be repaid to the PBGC before the airline could have




emerged from bankruptcy protection, would have rendered the
airline worthless. The new stock of the reformed corporation
began trading on February 3, 2006, at $40 per share and closed
the week at $34.60 per share. 7 ° That gave the airline an im-
plied market valuation of $4.32 billion.' 7' Being required to re-
pay the entire pension obligation would have meant the end of
the airline and little or no recovery for the PBGC. As it stands,
the PBGC is in line to recover some portion of its losses, albeit
in unusual fashion. The agency, as part of its settlement agree-
ment with United (discussed in Part II, infra), owns twenty per-
cent of the reorganized airline. 172 The demands of an
unrelenting superpriority status creditor would have made such
an arrangement unworkable.
E. A MoVE TO A HYBRID GOVERNMENT-PRIVATE MODEL
OF PENSION INSURANCE
The most promising suggestions, however, come from Rich-
ard Ippolito, the former chief economist at the PBGC. 173 Mr.
Ippolito's to the point analysis stands in stark contrast to the
incremental tinkering proposed by other followers of the
PBGC.174 He places the blame for the agency's woes squarely on
the moral hazard created by a system that rewards companies by
allowing them to book earnings from the overfunding of their
plans but push underfunding onto the PBGC. I1 5 Worse yet, as
he points out, Congress allows companies with underfunded
plans to stretch out their repayments over long periods of time,
often granting extreme lenience when lobbied and allowing
companies to make no contributions during economic down-
turns or particularly difficult times for certain industries, includ-
ing the airlines. 176
His recommendations are straightforward: either premiums
must go up, or distributions must go down, but under no cir-
170 Kathleen Pender, Market Disinclined to Buy Shares in a Reorganized United Air-
lines, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Feb. 5, 2006, atj-1.
171 Id.
172 Associated Press, United Airlines' New Stock Starts Trading, ABC NEWS, Feb. 2,
2006, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=1572130&CMP=OTC-RSS
Feeds03l2&ad=true.
1v Richard A. Ippolito, How to Reduce the Cost of Federal Pension Insurance, CATO
INST.: POL'Y ANALYSIS, No. 523 (Aug. 24, 2004), available at http://www.cato.org/
pubs/pas/pa523.pdf.
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cumstance is the current system of government sponsorship via-
ble. ' Ideally, Ippolito envisions a system of private pooling of
pension-plan-provider premiums, which charges a general mar-
ket risk-based premium and a firm risk-specific premium to
more closely mirror the true long-term cost of insuring plans
with the expected net present value of distributions. 178 He stops
short, however, of recommending the complete withdrawal of
the federal government from the equation, and recommends
that the PBGC or some other agency provide a public pool in
which risky companies unable to find private insurance partners
could participate. 7 9 While on the right track, his suggestion
falls short for the same reason as those that propose increased
base- and variable-rate premiums: the healthy would leave the
system, leaving only the weak to contribute little but demand an
eventual bailout.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the PBGC is a ticking time bomb.
There is no doubt that the magnitude of the eventual taxpayer
bailout of the system, if nothing is done, is going to make the
Savings & Loan crisis of the 1980's look mild. Estimates of the
current underfunding of defined benefit plans run into the
hundreds of billions of dollars.
On the other hand, it appears that Congress has no intention
of taking the politically difficult steps necessary to prevent such
a catastrophe. The most recent amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code were twenty-five years in the making, and there is no deny-
ing that cries from the PBGC and those that closely follow the
pension crisis in this country rang out for changes to be made to
improve the priority of the pension guarantor, if nothing else, to
reduce the avalanche of unfunded plans currently being foisted
upon the PBGC, especially by the airlines. While no consensus
existed about how best to improve the PBGC's bankruptcy stand-
ing, there should not have been any question that something
should have been done, on the model of the advantages given
the utility companies, or even to commercial landlord/credi-
tors. Nothing, however, was done.
Similarly, the courts that have recently been charged with
monitoring the PBGC have chosen to allow events to take their
177 Id. at 13.
178 Ippolito, supra note 173, at 15.
179 See id. at 12.
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course. Recent cases have held that, whatever may have been
the intent of Congress when it created the system of voluntary,
distress, and involuntary plan terminations, the situation now
calls for allowing the PBGC to do whatever it can to preserve
whatever assets for which it can negotiate, oftentimes in ex-
change for its help in allowing the airlines and other large em-
ployers to breach their collective bargaining agreements
through the novel new "involuntary voluntary" terminations.
Doing so, however, was a half-measure much worse than no
action at all. Perhaps allowing the PBGC considerable discre-
tion-too much at times-was an act of statutory construction.
Perhaps it was an act of judicial pragmatism. For certain, doing
so prolonged the inevitable and increased the ultimate cost of
bailing out the program.
It is time for all parties, the courts included, to admit that the
nation's pension plans, the PBGC, and therefore the taxpayers,
are in trouble. Tinkering with rates and moving the PBGC up
one rung on the short and rickety ladder of bankruptcy priority
in the scramble for too few assets are too little too late. It is time
for honest assessment, and because these earlier opportunities
were lost-time for difficult decisions. All parties involved will
sacrifice. Former shareholders in bankrupt airlines, and those
that will inevitably become bankrupt, face the complete loss of
their equity investments. Creditors must accept that their claims
must be (at least partially) subordinated to a higher good. Em-
ployees must accept a reduced pension, much like everyone
must accept a reduced level of all other social programs, such as
social security and health care benefits. Worse yet, the taxpayers
must accept another multi-billion dollar bailout of a program
that benefited few. There may have been a time when the pro-
gram could be saved-but that time is not now.
2006] PBGC 407
LAS. it*
Articles
4LLAS. 1I
